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The Rise of Reason in Planning Law: Daniel R.
Mandelker and the Relationship of the Comprehensive
Plan in Land Use Regulation
Edward J. Sullivan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the comfort and relative certitude of our present views on
planning law allow us to overlook the role of our honoree, Professor
Daniel R. Mandelker, in the development of that law in the United
States. Those views, of course, relate to the importance of the
comprehensive plan in the land use regulatory process and to the
function of the courts in reviewing local, governmental rezoning
actions in that process. It is indeed remarkable that so much has
changed in these areas during one professional lifetime. It is even
more remarkable that one man has played such a key role in those
changes.
It has been over 50 years since Professor Mandelker received his
law degree and over 25 years since he was appointed the Howard A.
Stamper Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis.
During that time, Professor Mandelker acted as an activist, author,
and teacher, reminding his hearers that planning and land use
regulation are not ends in themselves. Additionally, he has served as
an expert witness and has authored, assisted, or commented upon
numerous appellate briefs. Professor Mandelker’s principal
accomplishments reflect his uncanny ability to understand and
influence the currents of planning law. In other words, Professor
Mandelker has been, and continues to be, a consummate “big picture”
* B.A., St. John’s University (N.Y.), 1966, J.D., Willamette University, 1969; M.A.
(History), Portland State University, 1973; Urban Studies Certificate, Portland State University,
1974; M.A. (Political Thought), University of Durham, 1998; Diploma in Law, University
College, Oxford (1984); LL.M., University College, London, 1998. The author gratefully
acknowledges the invaluable contribution of Kelly Hopper, J.D. 2000, Northwestern School of
Law, in the preparation of this article.
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scholar.
This article is one of many praising the life and work of Professor
Mandelker. Because no single article could recount and explain the
significance of Professor Mandelker’s long and productive career, the
various participants in this festschrift have sought to highlight various
aspects of his outstanding career. Without ignoring Professor
Mandelker’s contributions to constitutional law, civil rights, social
equity, and many other areas of planning law, this article focuses
upon the skills of our honoree in presenting and advocating the
fundamental organizing principles of planning law itself. Today, most
scholars universally accept these principles of planning law as the
dominant paradigm in the field, that is, that land use regulations and
actions are subordinate to a separate policy document. This policy
document, usually referred to as the “general” or “comprehensive”
plan, provides the standard to judge the fidelity of regulations and
actions, including rezonings. It is true jurisdictions do not universally
or uniformly accept these principles. However, it is also generally
true that most jurisdictions accept those principles and that legislation
and caselaw show a definite trend towards such acceptance. No one,
least of all Professor Mandelker, would claim to be the sole laborer in
this effort. There is, however, a striking relationship between the
advocated ideals of Professor Mandelker and the evolution of the law
in these fields.
Before venturing further, the author wishes to disclose his long
personal and professional friendship with Professor Mandelker and
close familiarity with much of his work. The author has worked as an
attorney, teacher, and writer in Oregon’s land use system and has
participated in a number of cases that have shaped that system and
have influenced the national picture. Two of those cases, Fasano v.
Board of County Commissioners of Washington County1 and Baker v.
City of Milwaukee,2 have been used as examples of salutary
developments in the law. In addition, the author has worked with
Professor Mandelker on the American Bar Association’s Advisory
Commission on Housing and Urban Growth,3 on the wording of the
1. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
2. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN
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American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code,4 and on a
number of Continuing Legal Education presentations. More recently,
the author and Professor Mandelker have taken different positions on
takings law in a report to the State and Local Government Section of
the American Bar Association.
In order to understand fully Professor Mandelker’s role in these
areas of planning law, one must understand the efforts to bring about
a common recognition of the nature of the comprehensive plan,
especially its relationship with land use regulations and the nature of
judicial review of rezoning actions. The first efforts to impose order
in this area arose out of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of
1926 (SZEA)5 and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928
(SPEA).6 A special advisory committee, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, prepared
both model acts. The now-famous Section 7 of the SZEA required
zoning regulations to be “in accordance with a comprehensive plan,”
but did not define what factors constituted such a document. The
SPEA vexingly referred to a “master” plan and a “city” plan, but not
to a “comprehensive” plan.7 Another noteworthy land use law writer,
Charles M. Haar, in the 1950s, ably called attention to the definitional
variances between the two enabling acts and to the resultant
inconsistency.8 Reconciliation difficulties were further evidenced by
GROWTH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN HOUSING LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW: HOUSING FOR ALL
UNDER LAW (Richard P. Fishman ed., 1978) [hereinafter “Fishman”].
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975) [hereinafter
“MODEL CODE”].
5. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (SZEA) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev., ed.
1926).
6. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (SPEA) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1928).
7. SPEA § 6.
8. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar,  In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 1154 (1955); Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353 (1955); Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne
Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Charles M. Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for
Whom? In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1954). Haar was not alone in his criticism. In his
planning law classic, Richard Babcock stated:
I suppose that every city planning student is required to write on the blackboard a
hundred times the Planner’s Oath: ‘Zoning is merely a tool of planning.’ Walter
Blucher asked some years ago if the zoning tail was wagging the planning dog. The
question points up the view of the planner that zoning is only a minor appendage to the
essential body, city planning.
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the fact that the SPEA was adopted by only about half the states,
while almost all the states accepted the SZEA. The SZEA also left
unanswered what standard of review should apply for zoning map
amendments, a separate legal issue related to the significance of the
comprehensive plan. The adoption of a map amendment, as with the
adoption of a zoning map itself, was usually accomplished through an
ordinance. In the absence of any guidance from the enabling
legislation, courts nearly always assume that a small-tract amendment
is, like the adoption of the zoning map itself, a legislative action. The
ease of that assumption was exceeded only by the significance of its
perhaps unintended consequences. If the action were legislative,
courts were necessarily limited from intervening because of
separation of powers and other practical considerations. A point
came, however, at which judges could no longer stand by and watch
local governments use the shield of deference to withstand challenges
to these so-called “legislative actions.” Those courts then turned to
nebulous formulae that are not found in the Constitution or enabling
legislation to separate ostensibly “good” from “bad” rezonings.9
It is not surprising that courts have been so innovative. Until
recently, almost every state delegated all planning and regulatory
authority to local governments with mixed, and largely disappointing,
results. To “save” regulatory authority from the absence of, or
inconsistency with, a comprehensive plan, the courts largely fudged,
finding no requirement of a separate comprehensive plan.10 In
“upholding” small-tract rezonings as legislative acts and
consequently rendering substantive judicial review difficult, the
courts created a Frankenstein— the virtually unreviewable zone
* * *
It is said that only when the community has, in its plan, set forth and exposed to public
scrutiny its goals and desires can the arbiter, required to settle land use disputes,
measure the reasonableness of the implementing ordinances. . ..
9. RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES 120-
21 (1966). See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR
URBAN CHANGE 57 (1971) (arguing that the real policies of a community are not found in any
document, but in the way the community responds to zoning change requests). This theme
surfaces repeatedly in his work.
10. Kozesnik v. Township of  Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1957).
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change. The courts then over-corrected, again fudged, and created an
anti-Frankenstein that either embraced criteria unrelated to the
substance of the action,11 was too mechanical and insufficiently
flexible,12 or was too susceptible to manipulation by judges.13
If confusion over the plan’s role (including its separate existence)
were not enough to ponder, land use law in America suffered from
the silence of the United States Supreme Court from 1928 through
1978 on the effect of the Constitution in this area of law. The Court
spoke only four times from 1926 to 1928. Perhaps it might be better
had the Court not spoken at all, for two of those four cases, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.14 and Nectow v. Cambridge,15 have been
used to uphold, or overturn, zoning regulations, depending upon
which case was chosen as authority. This is not surprising, as both
cases were decided near the end of the era of substantive due process
analysis. In that era, the Court’s economic, social and political
11. The Washington courts have adopted the “appearance of fairness” rule, under which,
regardless of the merits of the action, the proceedings must not only be fair, but also appear to
be fair to a disinterested observer, viz. a judge. See, e.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 453 P.2d 832
(Wash. 1969).
12. The Maryland “change or mistake” rule is another court-made rule, which a number of
other states have adopted. Under that rule, the original zoning scheme is given credence, but [a
change in physical circumstances or a showing of a mistake in the original zoning scheme] must
justify changes to that scheme for small parcels. See MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 89-96.
13. Many courts developed “spot zoning,” an extra-statutory review. This rule requires the
court to strike down a zone if there is insufficient justification for locating a “spot” of an
inconsistent zone in a “sea” of otherwise inconsistent zones. The difficulty with this criterion
(in addition to its illegitimacy) is its lack of content. Compare MANDELKER, supra note 9, at
70-75 (criticizing this rule).
14. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Although Euclid upholds a local zoning ordinance, Mandelker
suggests it exemplifies one of the difficulties inherent in American planning law, that is, the
difficulties of emphasizing individual over collective rights. In contrast to our English brethren,
Americans achieve consensus on only a few matters, most of them directly related to health and
safety. Mandelker suggests that this individualistic bias arises out of the role of nuisance law in
the American legal psyche; furthermore, he notes the role of the nuisance analogy in upholding
zoning in the Euclid case. Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of Law in the Planning Process, 30 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 26, 27-31 (1965). See also MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 175-76.
15. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Nectow perhaps illustrates Mandelker’s thesis as it strikes down
an ordinance because there was no justification for imposing different zoning designations on
similar property. This approach makes compact urban growth boundaries and homogeneity of
appearance all the more difficult, particularly because of its reliance on the nuisance analogy.
See Mandelker, supra note 14, at 31-35. Similarly, Mandelker finds it against the American
legal grain to enforce compaction after a low-density pattern has been established.  Id. at 32-33.
Mandelker’s concept of a meta-legal ethic as a constraint on regulation appears to be a sound
one.
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preferences were often masked in formulaic incantations of
constitutional law. Even after the demise of substantive due process,16
the dead hand of this theory continued to influence various lower
federal and state courts long thereafter.
The Supreme Court’s other “contribution” to land use law is in the
“takings” field. After nearly a century and a half of an understanding
that the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution was limited to
appropriation of title or physical occupation of property, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes favored the world with his opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.17 The court found that if a
regulation went “too far,” it was transmuted into a taking and
required compensation to be valid.18 Although largely ignored for
over fifty years, Mahon, and its cousins, the dicta in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,19 and the unfounded (and largely unused) factors of Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,20 have been grist for
the mill for thousands of commentators. Moreover, those cases have
become the instruments of a new generation of jurists who have
become tired of judicial restraint and seek to re-invent substantive
due process under the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution.21
It is neither fair, nor accurate, to state sweepingly that Professor
Mandelker strode on the scene of confusion and created order out of
chaos. However, as the following portions of this article will show,
Professor Mandelker assisted greatly in the understanding of planning
law issues, as well as consolidating and evaluating proposed solutions
16. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938).
Mandelker notes that the Reagan Era, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON
HOUSING 200 (1982)) questioned the presumption of validity of legislative judgments. The
report suggests reversing the presumption of validity unless the regulation were “necessary to
achieve a vital and pressing governmental interest.” Id. The commission report went nowhere.
It did, however, inspire Mandelker to defend the existing state of affairs. See Daniel R.
Mandelker, Reversing the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land Use Litigation; Is
Legislative Action Necessary?, 30 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1986). Mandelker
argued against the report because the use of a quasi-judicial standard in judicial review places
the burden on the applicant and, if approved, the local government, to demonstrate conformity
of the new zone to the plan.  Id. at 14.
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. Id. at 415.
19. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
20. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
21. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
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to these problems. More importantly, he has helped us all understand
land use law as a single entity, rather than as a series of disjointed,
unrelated legislation and actions.
II. MANDELKER THE PLANNING LAW SCHOLAR
Professor Mandelker’s credentials as an academic are impressive.
The abridged recitation of his academic achievements in the law
include his receipt of an LL.B degree from the University of
Wisconsin in 1949 and his J.S.D. from Yale in 1956. He was also
named as a member of Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of the Coif. He
has taught law at Drake University, Indiana University, the
University of Washington, and Columbia University (as a Walter E.
Meyer Visiting Research Professor of Law and Social Problems). He
has also been a Ford Foundation Fellow at Yale University. Since
1974, he has been Howard A. Stamper Professor of Law at
Washington University in St. Louis. He has also served as a Ford
Foundation Law Faculty Fellow in London and has acted as an
attorney for the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency in
Washington D.C.
Mandelker’s awards are the envy of any academician or planning
lawyer. He has been Senior Fellow, Research Fellow, or Visiting
Fellow at the Urban Land Institute (1989-95), at the University
College in London, and at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark.
He has also been a visiting scholar at the Department of Urban
Planning in Haifa, Israel, at the Institute of State and Law in
Moscow, and has been a faculty member at the Brookings Institution
Urban Program. He has also received the John C. Vance Award (with
A. Kolis) for the Most Outstanding Paper on Transportation Law
from the Transportation Research Board.
Space permits mention of only a very few of Professor
Mandelker’s lectures, but they illustrate not only the esteem in which
he is held, but also the breadth of his compass in land use law. He
gave the Inaugural Norman Williams Jr. Lecture at the Annual
Symposium on Law and Public Policy at Rutgers University Law
School in Newark in 1997. He was the 1992-93 National
Distinguished Lecturer at the Journal of Land Use and Environmental
Law at Florida State University, and he gave the Fifteenth Denman
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Lecture at the Department of Land Economy at the University of
Cambridge in England in 1992. Additionally, he has participated in
the Annual Zoning Institute for the American Planning Association
from 1981-90 and is a frequent speaker at planning and planning law
conferences.
Professor Mandelker has consulted with local, state and national
governments around the world, but much of his work has been for
planning and planning-law related groups. For example, he has
served the American Planning Association in the areas of
constitutional law, housing, and revisions of state-enabling
legislation. He has also served that organization by chairing its
division council and its planning and law division. He has served the
Transportation Research Board on legal issues related to
transportation planning. He has reviewed and revised land use
regulations for the Urban Land Institute. Finally, he has advised the
American Bar Association’s Special Commission on Housing and
Urban Development Law and its Advisory Commission on Housing
and Urban Growth.
In addition, Professor Mandelker has authored or co-authored
more than 20 books dealing with planning law, including four
textbooks used in law schools across the country. Professor
Mandelker has written extensively on the role of the state in
preventing discrimination in housing and in providing housing for the
poor. On these issues, Mandelker has been a passionate and
unwavering advocate. He also “walks his talk” by spending time with
various task forces and advisory committees in this area. He has
served on various task forces on housing affordability22 and has
participated in two federal studies on urban blight and tenant
22. For example, Mandelker is presently on the Advisory Board for the Revitalization of
Central Cities and has served on the American Planning Association’s Task Force on
Affordable Housing in 1992-1993. He advised the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee
on Banking and Urban Affairs on hearings in connection with the effects of land use controls on
housing affordability from 1989-1991. In addition to chairing the Subcommittee on Assisted
Housing of the Housing Task Force Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives’
Democratic Caucus from 1981-1982, Mandelker served on the Special Committee on Housing
and Urban Development Law for the American Bar Association from 1980-1982 and the
Association’s Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth from 1976-1977. He has
also served on Senator Alan Cranston’s Ad Hoc Housing Policy Committee for the American
Planning Association from 1987-1990.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/12
p323+Sullivan+Edward.doc 01/04/01
2000] The Rise of Reason in Planning Law 331
relocation.23 He has written a book on the use of housing subsidies24
and chapters in books dealing with housing discrimination.25 Finally,
Mandelker has written a series of perceptive law review articles
dealing with housing policy.26 There is no question that Mandelker’s
brief stint with the Federal Housing and Home Finance Agency left
an impression on his work; he has opposed discrimination and has
advocated for a state role in providing housing.
Although a commitment to social justice in Mandelker’s work is
profound, it is by no means the only object of his attention in
planning law. He has, in addition to the teaching and fellowships
outlined above, undertaken a good deal of work in the international
planning field, from the United Nations27 to the United States
Information Agency28 in various countries around the world.29
23. Mandelker participated in three United States Public Health Service research projects
involving the Rationale for Public Powers Over Slum Housing from 1968-1969, Tenement
Landlord Relocation from 1967-1968, and The Role of Blight Determination in the Urban
Renewal Process from 1965-1968.
24. HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND (1973). See also DANIEL
R. MANDELKER & ROGER MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND
PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 1979).
25. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, HOUSING ISSUES IN AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE
FOR THE PUBLIC (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993); Daniel R. Mandelker, Group Homes: The
Supreme Court Revives the Equal Protection Clause in Land Use Cases, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 3.01-3.05 (Janice R. Moss
ed., 1986); Daniel R. Mandelker, The Constitutionality of Inclusionary Zoning: An Overview, in
INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DOWNTOWN (Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985).
26. Daniel R. Mandelker, Making Difficult Choices for Lesser-Income Housing Subsidies,
8 URB. L. & POL’Y 191 (1986); Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and Exclusionary
Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217 (1977); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Strategies in English Slum Clearance and Housing Policies, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 800
(1969); Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, and Just Compensation: A
Rationale for the Exercise of Public Powers over Slum Housing, 67 MICH. L. REV. 635 (1969).
27. United Nations Centre on Housing, Building and Planning, Expert Meeting on
Regional and National Development Planning (1972-73).
28. U.S.I.A. Overseas Speakers Program, Israel and Yugoslavia.
29. CONSULTANCY ON MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, STRATEGY PLAN (1973-73); Daniel R.
Mandelker, City Planning in the Soviet Union: Problems of Coordination and Control, 2 URB.
L. & POL’Y 97 (1979); Daniel R. Mandelker, Planning and Housing in the Yugoslav Republic
of Slovenia, 4 URB. L. & POL’Y 357 (1982); research project for the Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy, Housing and Planning in Yugoslavia (1981); consultancy on Hong Kong Amortization
Study (1993-94); research project on The Role of Law in Facilitation Urban Development for
Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (1970-72); The Capacity of the Legal System to
Facilitate the Urban Development Process: Korea and The Philippines, SEADAG project No.
70101 (Daniel R. Mandelker ed., 1972).
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However, Mandelker has been especially keen on the impacts of the
common law traditions of real property as they affect planning law
and has undertaken a number of scholarly projects to study this
area.30
Professor Mandelker has also studied and written extensively on
the relationship between planning and environmental law. He has
also served on a number of high-visibility panels for government and
professional associations on these issues.31 In addition, Professor
Mandelker has been a prolific author, both of books32 and chapters in
books,33 monographs34 and articles.35 These works demonstrate his
30. In addition to his Ford Foundation Fellowship and the Denman Lecture noted above,
Mandelker has authored a monograph entitled Environmental Policy: The Next Generation, the
article arising out of the Denman Lecture (1993), Daniel R. Mandelker, GREEN BELTS AND
URBAN GROWTH: ENGLISH TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN ACTION (1963); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Notes from the English: Compensation in Town and Country Planning, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 699 (1961).
31. Among other activities, Professor Mandelker has been a member of the Commission
on Environmental Law of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature since 1997,
has prepared a Study of Effectiveness of the Implementation of the National Environmental
Policy Act for the United States Council on Environmental Quality from 1994-1995, and has
consulted for the American Planning Association on The Relationship of State Environmental
Policy Acts to State, Regional and Local Planning as part of the Association’s Model State
Planning and Land Use Regulation Legislation Project from 1996-1998. He has also written
research papers for the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Emission Density
Zoning as an Air Pollution Control (1973-75), and The Contribution of Urban Planning to Air
Quality (1972-73). The Argonne National Laboratory also used the former paper in a study in
1977-1978.
32. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (2d ed. 1999); FREDERICK R.
ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 1990); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981); Daniel R.
Mandelker, Environmental and Land Use Controls Legislation (1976 & 1992 supp.); GEORGE
HAGEVIK ET AL., AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING LEGAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1974); Daniel R. Mandelker,
Managing Our Urban Environment: Cases, Texts and Problems (2d ed. 1971).
33. See Integrating State Environmental Policy Acts with Local Planning and Corridor
Maps, in AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK:
MODEL STATUTES FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (1998); Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Legal Framework for Environmental Review
of State and Local Public Works Projects in INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC WORKS (1992); Environmental Protection, in THE
PRACTICE OF STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING (Frank S. Ho et al. eds., 1986); The Clean Air
Act: Land Use and Transportation Implications, in Proceedings, National Conference on Land
Use and Transportation Planning and Air Quality Management (1975); Quality Standards for
the Control of Air Pollution, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES (Norman Marcus & Marilyn W. Groves eds., 1970); Daniel R.
Mandelker, New Incentives and Controls in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: THE NEXT
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broad understanding of national and state environmental legislation
and the impacts of such legislation on planning practice.
Three other areas related to planning law demonstrate the breadth
and depth of Professor Mandelker’s grasp of planning law beyond the
areas in which this article seeks to illuminate his contributions. This
article relates only to the subjects of the role of the comprehensive
plan to regulation and the views taken by the courts as to small-tract
rezoning. Additional areas of substantial contribution include:
1. Constitutional Law— Professor Mandelker has been a member
of the American Planning Association’s Amicus Curiae Committee
since 1995 and has served on that Association’s Property Rights Task
Force. He served as an expert witness in the Pyramid Mall case in
Vermont36 and co-authored a brief for the American Planning
Association in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.37 His
various law school textbooks deal at length with constitutional law
questions. In addition, he has written chapters in books on
constitutional law subjects38 and authored numerous articles as well.39
FIFTY YEARS (William R. Ewald, Jr., 1968).
34. See Environmental Policy: The Next Generation, supra note 30; The Application of
the National Environmental Policy Act to Highway Projects (with G. Feder), National
Cooperative Highway Research Program, Research Results Digest No. 165 (1987).
35. For example, see Daniel R. Mandelker, Melding State Environmental Policy Acts with
Land-Use Planning and Regulations, 49 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1997). Daniel R.
Mandelker, The Conflict Between Environmental Land Use Regulation and Housing
Affordability, 15 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1 (1992); Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling
Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 479 (1989); Daniel
R. Mandelker, NEPA Alive and Well: The Supreme Court Takes Two, 19 ENVTL. L. REP 10365
(1989); Daniel R. Mandelker, Cleaning the Air: The Costs and Benefits of Air Quality Control,
5 Wash. Univ. Law School Magazine, at 30 (1983); Daniel R. Mandelker & Felice Taub,
Constitutional Limitations on Emission Quotas as an Air Pollution Control Strategy, 8
ECOLOGY L.Q. 269 (1979); Daniel R. Mandelker & Thea A. Sherry, Emission Quota Strategies
as an Air Pollution Control Technique, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1976); Daniel R. Mandelker &
Susan B. Rothschild, The Role of Land Use Controls in Combating Air Pollution Under the
Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235 (1973).
36. In re Pyramid Co. of Burlington, 449 A.2d 915 (Vt. 1982).
37. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
38. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause: Conflicting Signals from
the Supreme Court, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 1994 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 7 (1995); Daniel R. Mandelker,
Principles on Due Process and Equal Protection, in LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989);
Daniel R. Mandelker, The Constitutionality of Inclusionary Zoning: An Overview 31, in
INCLUSIONARY ZONING MOVES DOWNTOWN (Dwight Merriam et al., 1985); Daniel R.
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He has also advocated for legislation changing federal ripeness
standards in takings cases in testimony before congressional
committees in recent years.40
2. Aesthetics and Sign Regulation— Professor Mandelker has
served as Director (1981-84 and 1986) and President (1987-88) of the
Coalition for Scenic Beauty and has participated as a member of the
National Advisory Committee on Outdoor Advertising for the United
States Department of Transportation (1980-82). In addition, he has
co-authored one of the most thoughtful books on the ability to
regulate signs and billboards41 and an article on control of
billboards.42 Professor Mandelker’s lifelong work in transportation
planning is a natural springboard for his work in this sector of
transportation and aesthetics in planning.
3. Antitrust Law— Because planning law has a significant impact
on competition, it is only natural that Professor Mandelker has
written in this area of the law as well. He has written a chapter on the
potential antitrust liability of local governments in regulation of land
uses43 and an article on the legitimacy of regulatory control of
competition.44
With his formidable breadth and depth of planning law expertise,
it may seem incomplete to concentrate on only one area of Professor
Mandelker, The Taking Issue in Land Use Regulation, in THE LAND USE POLICY DEBATE IN
AMERICA (1981).
39. Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the Takings Clause, 81 MARQ. L.
REV. 9 (1997); Property Rights and Takings, with A. L. Strong and E. Kelly, 62 J. AM. PLAN.
ASSN. 5 (1996); Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB.
LAW. 215 (1995); Daniel R. Mandelker, Of Mice and Missiles: A True Account of Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L., 285 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker,
Takings: Trilogy II, 44 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., 3 (1992); Daniel R. Mandelker, Applying
the Ripeness Doctrine in Federal Land Use Litigation, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 49 (1988);
Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987); Daniel R. Mandelker, The Free Speech Revolution in Land Use
Control, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 51 (1984).
40. Testimony before the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on H. R. 1534 (1998).
41. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & WILLIAM R. EWALD, STREET GRAPHICS AND THE LAW
(1988).
42. Daniel R. Mandelker & Linda Reiman, The Billboard Ban: Aesthetics Come of Age,
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (1979).
43. Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law and Antitrust Liability, in LAND USE LAW:
ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES, Part II (Edith M. Netter ed., 1984).
44. Daniel R. Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14
ZONING DIG. 33 (1962).
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Mandelker’s work. Yet, as the many articles in this issue
demonstrate, Professor Mandelker has both knowledge and vision.
And, as set forth in the introduction to this article, it is our purpose to
review and comment upon this vision and the impact of Professor
Mandelker’s seminal role of selecting and expounding upon ideas
and making those ideas part of a coherent vision of planning law. The
ideas are fairly simple when considered in light of the new
millennium: (1) land use regulations must be based upon a coherent,
binding policy, (2) delineated in an adopted plan, and (3) small
zoning changes must be viewed as quasi-judicial, not legislative,
actions. We now proceed to examine Professor Mandelker’s
treatment of these ideas.
III. MANDELKER, AS PLANNING LAW VISIONARY
The role of visionary is not limited to originating new thoughts.
Indeed, in a diverse field such as planning law, many thoughts swirl
about in cases, statutes, and speculative writings. A visionary is one
who can separate the useful wheat from the greater volume of chaff,
observe and enhance new trends, and criticize the present with a view
to the future. This portion of the article focuses on Mandelker’s
specific gifts of clear conceptualization and leadership.
As mentioned in part I, Charles M. Haar wrote about the logical
disconnect between the SZEA’s requirement that zoning be “in
accordance with a comprehensive plan” and the reality of the
situation when there is no plan or a proposed rezoning is inconsistent
with the plan.45 Similarly, Richard Babcock wrote tellingly of the
45. Mandelker himself summarizes the difficulties inherent in the American “style” of
land use regulation, as compared, for example, to our British counterparts in The Role of Law in
the Planning Process. Mandelker, supra note 14. However, in 1971, in The Zoning Dilemma,
he indicates that the American system was moving towards its British counterpart in
establishing an administrative model for planning and regulatory actions. Id. at xii. Indeed, in a
far-seeing article, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.
L.Q. 60 (1963), Mandelker points out the inherent limitations of viewing land use actions as
administrative or quasi-judicial, rather than as legislative. Id. at 60-61. He suggests that an
emphasis on better articulated policy standards would benefit zoning administration. He stresses
the differences between policy making and policy application. Id. at 61, 64 (footnote omitted).
The distinction was to become more pronounced in his later work; however, Mandelker
recognized the issue of characterizing local land use decisions as well as the role of the
comprehensive plan under the SZEA very early in his career,  at 61-65. See also id. at 97-99.
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tendency of courts to invalidate “bad” zone changes, guided only by
their “sense of smell.”46 Haar believed that the plan should be, as he
termed it, an “impermanent constitution,”47 while Babcock argued for
greater procedural and substantive limitations, legislatively created, if
necessary, to give legitimacy to judicial review.
In 1973, the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruling in Fasano v. Board
of County Commissioners of Washington County48 dealt with the
structural issues that had plagued planning law for nearly half a
century. These issues included the existence and role of the
comprehensive plan and the role of courts in reviewing zone
changes.49 Fasano was decided immediately before Oregon enacted
its distinctive land use program and might have been discounted as
part of that unique legislative program had not Professor Mandelker
and others seen the case for what it was— a sea change by the courts
in planning law. Also, Fasano could have been distinguished because
it arose under a statutory scheme in which a separate comprehensive
plan was clearly required.50 Professor Mandelker saw the significance
of Fasano and its near-contemporary, Baker v. City of Milwaukee,51
in which the plan was again upheld as the governing document under
legislation similar to the SZEA.52 Moreover, Fasano’s singular
contribution of holding both that the comprehensive plan is the
governing document and that judicial review, undertaken with small-
tract rezonings as quasi-judicial and as judged by the fidelity to the
comprehensive plan, created a very different way of conducting
business in land use law.
Fasano and Baker might have been shrugged off as a
phenomenon unique to Oregon had not Mandelker’s seminal article,
The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation53
(hereinafter the “Mandelker article”), discussed the cases not only in
46. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game, supra note 9, at 101-11.
47. Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 353 (1955).
48. 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). See id. at 27-30.
49. See id. at 27-30.
50. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 215.110 (1991).
51. 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 1975).
52. Id. at 779.
53. Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1976).
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a major legal publication, but also in their proper context. In the first
few pages of this article, Mandelker sets out the difficulties presented
by then-contemporary views of the plan by courts and writers and
proposes to point out new directions to resolve that confusion. 54 The
situation in 1976 arose out of lack of clarity in the SPEA and SZEA
as to the role of the plan, as discussed in Part I. He speculated that the
ambiguity may have been caused by a disagreement among the
advisory committee, which had formulated both acts, as to whether a
separate plan was required.55 Alternatively, the committee may have
disagreed as to the plan’s nature; whether it involved issues of capital
improvement or whether it was strictly a “zoning plan.”56 Like
Professor Haar, Mandelker accepts Kozesnik v. Montgomery
Township57 as the paradigm of a unitary view of planning, which
54. Id. at 901-09.
55. Id. at 901-02.
56. Id. at 902-03. The SZEA was adopted before the SPEA and, among the states, more
often than not, further complicated the situation. Mandelker suggests the real flaw was that
communities did not “pre-zone” lands for their ultimate use, but rather adopted a policy of
“watchful waiting,” allowing developers to request increased densities or intensities of use.
MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 103-05.
57. 131 A.2d 1 (1957). Mandelker wrote an article similar to his 1976 article in 1967 and
noted the significance of comprehensive planning in the urban renewal process. He began this
article by saying:
Comprehensive plans are prepared and adopted to guide and coordinate community
growth. To be effective, they must apply to public as well as private development, a
relationship suggested in state planning enabling statutes, but left largely without
sanction in state law. Real impetus to control public development through
comprehensive planning has come from federal legislation, which has conditioned a
wide variety of federal grants on the adoption of local or regional plans. Urban renewal
was the first program to impose a federal comprehensive planning requirement.
Through urban renewal, local public agencies acquire substandard areas, clear them
and sell the cleared land for redevelopment, in accordance with a project plan for the
cleared area. The federal legislation, in turn, requires a local legislative finding that the
project plan conforms to a general plan for the development of the locality as a whole.
Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 25, 26 (1967) (footnotes omitted). Mandelker’s concern, however, was that
uncritical acceptance of that requirement without critical evaluation of results was not useful.
Following a review of the planning requirements in urban renewal legislation for selecting and
planning various sites and redeveloping them, this article reviews two specific urban renewal
projects (in Nashville and St. Louis). Mandelker identifies the major planning problems in
urban renewal as involving the disconnect between the planner and the decision-maker, the
limitations of physical planning in resolving social issues, the difficulties of coordination
among public agencies, and disagreement over the substantive role of planning in urban
renewal. Id at 64-68.
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conflated the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan, thereby
avoiding the troubling statutory requirement that zoning be “in
accordance with the comprehensive plan.” The Kozesnik court found
the plan to be the product of a rational process and not piecemeal in
nature, but did not require a separate document.58 Confusion reigned
in planning law, and Professor Mandelker thoughtfully analyzed that
situation before proposing various remedies.
Mandelker’s analysis concluded that the confusion was caused by
two interrelated factors: making the plan optional under the SPEA
and the failure to require the plan as part of the land use regulatory
process.59 These failures were magnified by innovations in the
regulatory process, such as the use of floating zones and planned unit
developments, or the later addition of capital facilities plans,
environmental and growth controls, and the like.60 It was Mandelker
who instinctively knew the significance of a case such as Golden v.
58. Kozevsnik v. Montgomery Township, 131 A.2d 1, 6-8 (1957). Mandelker also noted
the short-lived reign of Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 164 A.2d 7 (1960), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated the use of a “flexible selective zoning” under the
statutory requirement that zoning be “in accordance with the comprehensive plan.” 164 A.2d at
11-12. This position was overruled both by statutory law and other cases. See Mandelker, supra
note 53, at 907-09.
59. Mandelker, supra note 53, at 909-10. In The Zoning Dilemma, Mandelker poses some
additional reasons for the failure of the enforcement of the statutory comprehensive plan
requirement:
The reasons advanced for this judicial emasculation of the statutory planning
requirement have been many, and are often pragmatic, the most conventional being the
point that many municipalities, especially the smaller ones, did not have plans until
recently, and that to enforce the statutory requirement rigidly would have prevented
municipal exercise of the zoning power. The explanation is suggestive, but it misses
the point. What happened was that the courts were willing to accept the role of the
zoning ordinance in adjusting land use interdependencies, but they were very reluctant
to review the value preferences which the ordinance incorporated. To have done so
would have involved the judiciary in the political function of evaluating community
goals, and this they were unwilling to do. A narrow judicial reading of the statutory
requirement avoided an appraisal of the community value judgments expressed in the
zoning ordinance, an interpretation buttressed by judicial adoption of the conventional
presumption that the zoning ordinance was constitutional unless proved otherwise.
Also of interest from this perspective are judicial interpretations of the comprehensive
plan requirement which emphasize a comprehensiveness in process as the essential
component of the statutory test, rather than the substantive content of the plan’s goals
and objectives.
Mandelker, supra note 9, at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 910-11.
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Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo,61 in which a regulatory
scheme based on well-considered and integrated, albeit imperfect,
capital facilities and land use plans survived highly intensive
statutory and constitutional challenges.62 It was also Mandelker who
pointed out the tendency of federal agencies to require planning as a
prerequisite for federal funding in the 1960s and 1970s.63
In a brief digression, Mandelker’s article turns to an abiding issue
in planning law, i.e., the relative certainty of “end-state” map plans
and more flexible, yet less precise, “policy plans.”64 Mandelker
suggests that, as the planning area widens and options increase, the
use of policy plans greatly assists planners, especially as information
becomes more detailed.65 Indeed, states have recognized roles for
comprehensive plans beyond that of the standard acts and require
both policy and map elements for those plans. The transition from the
map plan to the policy/map plan was a significant planning and legal
innovation, which Professor Mandelker predicted and encouraged
through his writings.
Moreover, the emphasis on growth controls following Ramapo
and statutory innovations arising out of the environmental movement
were facilitated by the use of policy plans. For example, consider the
policy plans of Oregon and California. California’s legislature has
traditionally set standards for local plans, and local governments
implement those standards, subject only to challenge in the California
court system. With regard to housing, local governments are required
to accommodate a fair share of regional need and to quantify that
need in local plans. On the other hand, in Oregon, the legislature has
set general standards, but largely delegated policymaking and
implementation to the state’s Land Conservation and Development
Commission. In both states, there is a statewide policy, implemented
61. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972), app. dismissed 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See also
Mandelker, supra note 53, at 911.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 915-18.
64. Id. at 915-20.
65. Id. at 918-20. Mandelker also cites Fasano and Baker. He might have added that
Fasano’s “plan” was a map on the wall with density guidelines for residential uses, without
policies. This may explain the Oregon Supreme Court’s grafting of two additional standards for
zone changes, i.e., that there be demonstrated “public need” and that no other available
properties be present. Id. at 920 n.86.
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by a plan, with quantified expectations. Here again, Professor
Mandelker’s observations and encouragement have pointed out and
enhanced these trends.
Professor Mandelker took on the Kozesnik rule, which was the
majority rule at that time, that is, that there need not be a separate
comprehensive plan with which the regulations must comply.
However, he advocated change through legislation and suggested that
the, “in accordance with the comprehensive plan” language be
applied very differently than in Kozesnik: “This article argues that for
effective implementation of a mandatory planning requirement the
courts must give presumptive weight to the policies of the
comprehensive plan as they are applied in land use control
administration, unless special circumstances indicate that the plan is
not entitled to such authority.”66
Mandelker suggests that the recent and documented value
judgment of a community as expressed in a comprehensive plan
would, and should, be given great weight when the regulatory scheme
is attacked.67 This position has proved prescient, especially in
growth-control cases, as a plan normally survives such challenges, as
exemplified by the well-documented plan in Ramapo and in the
justifications given in the upheld plan in Construction Industry Ass’n
v. City of Petaluma.68
66. Mandelker, supra note 53, at 922. Mandelker suggests these “special circumstances”
include landowner attacks on the plan (such as constitutional invalidity) or its use in rezoning.
Id. Nevertheless, in advocating legislative change over judicial efforts at reform, Mandelker
realized that political consensus was necessary before any reform could take root. He also knew
that litigation was often dispositive only among the parties involved and that legislation and
administration were necessary to resolving significant social problems. Daniel R. Mandelker,
Legal and Political Forums for Urban Change, 405 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41
(1973). However, in The Zoning Dilemma, Mandelker quotes with approval from the work of
his colleague Professor J. J. H. Beuscher:
Too often, we think of the roles of law in our society in static rather than dynamic
terms. Law as it is made by our courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies is not
an end in itself; it is a means to policy goals, particularly in the allocation of resources.
It is a myth . . . that law’s only role is that of constraint, of putting on the brakes.
Instead, many legal rules and devices are efficient, flexibly adjustable conduits for
change and development.
MANDELKER, supra note 9, at vi.
67. Id. at 922-31.
68. Construction Industry Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
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However, the tour de force in an otherwise remarkable article was
Professor Mandelker’s peroration on the role of the comprehensive
plan and the zoning amendment process.69 Mandelker begins by
noting evolution of “spot zoning” and the “change or mistake” and
“appearance of fairness” rules intended to halt ill-advised zoning
changes. However, he also notes a reversal of the presumption of
legislative validity, which otherwise might apply.70 Then, using
Fasano as an example, Mandelker suggests another alternative, i.e.,
treating a small-tract zone change as a quasi-judicial act and thus
placing the burden on the proponent to demonstrate conformity with
the map and policies of the “comprehensive plan.”71 Mandelker
perceived a mixed role for the comprehensive plan, so that reliance
on the plan might be less necessary when the proposed development
is consistent with the surrounding area, but more necessary when the
use is new to an undeveloped area or out of character with these
surrounding uses.72 That proposition has not resonated in states
requiring conformity of the comprehensive plan by statute or
caselaw, but has raised the consciousness of those states that follow
69. MANDELKER, supra note 53, at 931.
70. Id. at 932 (footnote omitted). Mandelker does not note the third judicial innovation in
this field, i.e., the “appearance of fairness” rule, which developed in Washington. However, he
did anticipate that rule in a book centering on the use of the zone change in the Seattle area in
the 1960s, where plans had policies, but noting the practical skepticism of courts to both
“legislative rezonings” and plans:
The amendment is more difficult. We have noted that the courts apply a presumption
of constitutionality to legislative actions in zoning, and are extremely reluctant to look
at the fairness with which zoning allocations are made much less the criteria on which
they are based. When courts do intervene to review the zoning amendment they may
be confused about their role. One problem is that a zoning amendment may appear to
have singled out one developer for special treatment. . . . If one developer receives a
zoning amendment for apartment development in one quadrant, why can’t another
developer likewise receive a zoning amendment for apartment development in another
quadrant? The situation suggests favoritism and discrimination, and the courts are
skeptical. They exhibit their skepticism by characterizing a rezoning of this kind as a
“spot” zoning, with overtones that it is presumptively invalid. But judicial handling of
these cases is often confused, and gets lost in the formalisms of the zoning system.
Mandelker, supra note 53, at 932-34.
71. Id. at 933-35. Mandelker correctly states that the Fasano court “adopted a qualified
version of the Maryland change-mistake rule.” Id. at 934 (footnote omitted). However,
Mandelker might have added that this version was never used again.
72. Id. at 935.
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Kozesnik, so that the plan is at least a factor in analyzing rezonings.73
Mandelker continues with his discussion of the role of the plan
and discusses the significance of the Baker case, in which the
presence of the plan (which was optional at the time) nevertheless
required a city to conform its regulations thereto, a “polar opposite”
to Kozesnik.74 Finally, Mandelker ends this meditation on the role of
the comprehensive plan in the rezoning process by considering the
possible amendment of the plan itself and the rules that must be used
to undertake such a development on a small-tract basis.75 He again
suggests the use of the quasi-judicial process and fidelity to the
remainder of the plan, particularly its policies.76 With the notable
exception of Florida, which has not passed finally on this matter, the
advice seems to have been taken.77 Again, presciently, Mandelker
suggests that states adopt standards and procedures to deal with plan
amendments.78
Mandelker then discusses how these common-sense ideas may be
implemented and recommends that reform be undertaken at the state
level via revisions of planning and land use regulations and their
enabling legislation. He also recommends that states become more
involved in the adoption and review of plans.79 Mandelker suggests
that the state legislature require adoption of comprehensive plans in
order to utilize some or all of the regulatory schemes that the plan
73. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897 (1968). See also Mandelker, supra note 53, at
937-39. Mandelker also discusses the utility of a reasoned basis in studies, data, and other plan-
like materials in upholding local regulations, while noting that some states mandate planning.
Daniel R. Mandelker & Edith M. Netter, Comprehensive Plans and the Law, in A PLANNER’S
GUIDE TO LAND USE LAW 17, 17-18 (Stuart Meek & Edith M. Netter, eds. 1983).
74. Mandelker, supra note 53, at 936 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 945-57.
76. Id. at 946-51.
77. See Dalton v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 99, 108-09 (Haw. 1969)
(holding that an ordinance to amend city and county plans was void due to noncompliance with
chapter safeguards for such amendments). Also, Florida has certified for review the question of
whether small-tract plan amendments must meet quasi-judicial standards.
78. Mandelker, supra note 53, at 950-51.
79. See id. at 951-65 (discussing revision of the neighboring legislation). Id. at 966-971
(discussing regional and state review of plans). Mandelker correctly poses three questions that
must be answered in legislative revisions: (1) “the form and content of the planning process to
be required at different governmental levels within the state;” (2) consistency of land use
controls to the comprehensive plan; and (3) the extent to which local planning programs should
be subject to review by other units of local government. Id. at 951.
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articulates.80 He further suggests that state aspirations be used
throughout the planning process, as opposed to the complete
delegation of authority, as in the standard acts.81 He also urges that
the state legislatures require local consistency to a comprehensive
plan, giving the California and Florida statutory schemes (both of
which fully define “consistency”) as examples.82 Finally, he urges
that legislatures provide the theory for determining fidelity to state
policies and local plans and regulations, utilizing the examples of
Oregon, Florida, and other states.83
Not content in advocating these significant changes in planning
law Mandelker also foresaw a number of the implications of these
changes, such as the need for greater state assistance to local planning
efforts, use of hearings officials, and the development of the
machinery to assure compliance with state policy.84 Again, Professor
Mandelker was prescient in understanding the implications of the
theoretical need for change, as well as its practical effects.
Not only did Mandelker offer the definitive article in the role of
the comprehensive plan and land use regulation, he also advocated
his views strongly in other forums, albeit with mixed reviews.
Mandelker wrote and spoke at the American Law Institute
proceedings that resulted in the adoption of A Model Land
Development Code, ALI’s model act designed to update the standard
acts of the 1920s. While this model act does give greater authority to
local governments that have comprehensive plans, Mandelker and his
allies were disappointed to find insufficient sympathy for the
requirement of a comprehensive plan as a precondition for land use
regulation.
Similarly, Mandelker was generally responsible for authoring a
chapter on the role of the plan as a means of providing housing for
low- and moderate-income households, urging that local plans
include and articulate state housing practices. An American Bar
80. Id. at 952-53.
81. Mandelker cites the Florida Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (1974)
as an example. Id. at 935 n.208 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177 (6)(a) (1975). See also
Mandelker, supra note 45; MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 63-70.
82. Mandelker, supra note 53, at 956-65.
83. Id. at 966-67.
84. Id. at 972-73.
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Association report on housing contained these suggestions, although
as just one of many possible means of providing greater housing
opportunities.
Mandelker has been the weaver of theory from cases and statutes,
one who has recognized and enhanced developments in the law by
his clear and analytical writings. More than any other author, he has
brought about acceptance of a significant, if not governing, role of
the comprehensive plan, land use regulation, and the treatment of
small-tract zoning (and plan) amendments as quasi-judicial.
IV. MANDELKER AS PLANNING LAW LEADER
This section reviews the influence of Professor Mandelker in
planning law, with special emphasis on his work in the two
aforementioned areas: the role of the comprehensive plan in the
regulatory process and the method of judicial review of small-tract
zone changes. Other contributions will be mentioned, particularly
where Professor Mandelker has left his mark in planning law. As has
been demonstrated in previous sections, Professor Mandelker has an
impressive educational background and academic career. His fields
of research in planning law have been important and his results
fruitful. He has been a leader in both the planning and legal
professions and has been especially helpful where those two fields
intersect. He has also been a trusted consultant to many public and
private organizations.
We now look to Professor Mandelker’s particular work in the role
of the comprehensive plan and the review of small-tract rezonings in
three particular areas.
1. The American Law Institute’s Model Land Development
Code— In 1963, some members of the American Law Institute
proposed crafting a successor to the SZEA and SPEA, the model
state-enabling legislation for land use regulation. As discussed above,
this legislation was assembled during the 1920s and was the basis for
most state-enabling legislation on planning and land use regulation.85
The Institute adopted various articles, including one in 1964 on the
85. See also Fishman, supra note 3, at 39 n.196.
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role of the plan, until the Model Code was completed in 1975.86
Aside from the allocation of power between state and local
governments, the thorniest issue that the Institute faced was whether
a formal plan should be a prerequisite to land use regulation. To the
disappointment of Mandelker and others, the Institute chose not to
require such a plan, although it did give additional authority to those
local governments that did adopt a plan.87
Mandelker urged the Institute to require a plan before regulations
were adopted.88 He prevailed, in a sense, although the Institute did
not require a plan. Instead, the Institute recognized that the plan was a
separate document from the regulations and promoted enhanced
planning by giving additional authority to local governments with
such plans.89 In addition, the Model Code gives greater deference to
86. The Institute’s introduction states that the analogy for this code should not be the
national uniformity of the Uniform Commercial Code, but rather the Model Penal Code
“designed as source material for re-thinking and improvement of prevailing norms.” MODEL
CODE, supra note 4, at xi.
87. The introduction summarizes the disposition:
[T]hough it was urged with ardor (and still is) that any authority to limit land
development should be conditioned on the drafting and approval of a local land
development plan, in the sense of Article 3, this position was rejected after long
consideration. The Code focuses instead on the required content, procedure for
adoption, and methods of administration of ordinances regulating land development
(essentially zoning and subdivision controls), forging new safeguards in these areas to
promote fairness and rationality. The adoption of a local land development plan is,
however, made a precondition of authority to grant special permits for planned unit
development or to permit the designation of specially planned areas – both as an
incentive to planning where it is most urgently demanded and as a protection against
arbitrary action. Beyond this, it was though unwise to mandate formal local planning
rather than to leave to local judgment estimation of the land planning need. This
seemed particularly sound in a system that envisages the possibility of state
intervention when local values are outweighed by larger state or regional concerns.
MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at xii. Mandelker’s hand can be seen in this excerpt from the
comment to the Model Code: “A person who looks at the text of the zoning ordinance or the
zoning map in order to ascertain the community’s policies toward land use may be
accumulating only meaningless information. . .. ‘The community’s real land use policy comes
to be expressed in the zoning amendment.’” Id. at 152 (quoting Jan Krasnowiecki, The Basic
System of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in The
New Zoning: Legal, Administrative and Economic Concepts and Techniques 3, 6 (N. Marcus &
M. Groves eds., 1970). Fishman, supra note 3, at 46 n.224.
88. Mandelker, supra note 50, at 954-55.
89. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at § 3-101 nn.1 & 3. In addition to the ability to
regulate planned unit developments (§ 2-210) and specially planned areas (§2-211), the Model
Code also authorizes criteria in its plan to be used in its development ordinance for certain
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decisions of local governments that have plans.90
With respect to judicial review of the Model Code’s equivalent to
rezoning, the Mandelker influence is also apparent. If review of an
administrative hearing decision is allowed, that review is conducted
on the record made below.91 More importantly, an amendment to a
local development ordinance is treated as an administrative order
(rather than as legislation).92
Finally, the Model Code contemplates that significant reallocation
of power among levels of government might be undertaken in order
to fulfill state policy goals. Mandelker and the other members of the
ABA Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth note that
planning can be an effective instrument of state housing policy and
urge consideration to that end.93
2. The American Bar Association’s Advisory Commission on
Housing and Urban Growth— Mandelker served as a member of this
Commission, which was created in 1974 with the purpose of: “. . .
development permission (§ 2-212), special preservation district regulations (§ 2-209),
reservation of land for future acquisition (§ 3-201), and discontinuance of existing land uses
(§ 4-102). These are not inconsiderable powers and were likely conceded as part of the price for
not requiring a plan in order to regulate. See also Fishman, supra note 3, at 230-32, 237-38.
90. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, § 9-110(3) states:
In a proceeding concerning the relationship of an order, rule or ordinance to the public
health, safety or welfare, the court shall give due weight to the fact that the order, rule
or ordinance was adopted by a local government having a Land Development Plan and
to the consistency of the challenged action with the applicable State or Local Land
Development Plan.
The comment to this section cites cases usually identified as “planning factor” cases, where the
plan is a significant, though not exclusive determinant of the validity of the land use action.
Similarly, § 8-503(b) accords no deference to a plan that has been rejected by the state planning
agency, which is charged with review of plans. Fishman, supra note 3, at 398-99 n.223.
91. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, § 9-101(3). The notes to this section indicate that this is
the same approach taken by the ALI’s Model State Administrative Procedure Act, so that the
administrative record provides the factual predicates for review of the order. See Daniel R.
Mandelker, Judicial Review of Land Development Controls Under the ALI Model Code, 1971
LAND-USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 101.
92. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, at § 9-101(7). In the ABA Advisory Committee Report
on Housing and Urban Growth, the Commission noted the possibility that procedural unfairness
may be exacerbated by the Model Code, which expands the discretionary powers of local
governments. On balance, however, the Model Code was seen as providing “greater fairness
and predictability in [the] . . . land use regulatory process by proposing explicit standards and
detailed procedures” for adoption of rules and the issuance of development orders. Fishman,
supra note 3, at 223.
93. Id. at 578-83.
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formulating legislative, administrative, and judicial alternatives and
reforms that will increase housing opportunity and choice and
promote a more rational urban growth process.”94 The Commission
said that it would provide the starting point for its efforts of the
American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code, but its
effort would be narrower in focus. The Commission concentrated on
“the special needs and character of desirable community
development,” dealt “more broadly with the socioeconomic
considerations that increasingly affect and are affected by local urban
growth and land use policies;” and addressed “courts as well as
legislatures with recommended approaches to urban growth.”95
Indeed, with respect to the areas under consideration, Mandelker’s
views on planning law were well received by his well-respected
colleagues on the Advisory Commission.
The Advisory Commission tackled perennial, difficult questions
of race, social justice, and regional general welfare. The Commission
traced the legal and economic trends in the United States. They
accurately predicted the difficulties of finding sufficient housing near
employment and associated that result with an outdated land use
system. Mandelker’s work can be seen in the prediction and
advisability of mandatory comprehensive planning, both as a way of
explaining fulfillment of the “in accordance with a comprehensive
plan” provision of section 7 of the SZEA and as a typical federal tool
of policy.96 Similarly, Mandelker’s hand can be seen in a portion of
an extensive chapter dealing with judicial remedies to ensure
inclusionary housing programs, anticipating the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s second iteration of So. Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel97 by several years. Much of the second Mt. Laurel case can be
seen in the recommendations of the advisory commission. However,
94. Id. at ix.
95. Id. at xii.
96. Id. at 49-51. Mandelker’s work is especially apparent here, as he draws upon his
environmental and transportation background in federal law to note that the federal government
typically requires state and local planning as a prerequisite for receipt of federal funds. He
suggests that binding local planning be mandatory for the receipt of federal housing funds.
97. Southern Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) (Mt. Laurel I), rev’d 456 A.2d 390 (1983). Mt. Laurel II Justice Frederic W. Hall, the
author of the first Mt. Laurel opinion, was a member of the Advisory Commission, along with
Mandelker.
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one particular reform associated with Mandelker found its way into
the Report, that is, that courts should re-examine their scope of
review for small-tract zoning changes so that they are seen as quasi-
judicial actions, in the same way that variances, special exceptions, or
conditional uses are reviewed by courts.98
The Commission revisited the comprehensive plan later in the
Report when it noted the work of the American Law Institute to
provide a policy consensus for land use regulation and recommended
that the use of such regulations be contingent on adoption of such a
plan.99 In addition, the Commission used another Mandelker theme,
the characterization of rezoning decisions as quasi-judicial to provide
a more effective judicial review than the non-statutory and highly
suspect “spot zoning” or other result-oriented judicial construct.100
98. Fishman, supra note 3, at 145. Mandelker used the Fasano case to illustrate the point.
At another place in the same report, the Commission noted Justice Stevens dissent in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 693-95 (1976), which used Fasano to
indicate that small-tract rezonings were not legislative acts referable to the electorate. Similarly,
the Commission notes the procedural safeguards that follow the characterization of small-tract
rezoning decisions as quasi-judicial. These safeguards include notice and an opportunity to be
heard, the right to present and rebut evidence, the right to an impartial tribunal, and the right to
a decision that is justified by findings based on the record. Id. at 280-87.
99. Fishman, supra note 3, at 231, 408-10. The Advisory Commission notes that the ALI
did not require adoption of a plan in order to regulate land use, though it did give more power to
those local governments that did so. Id. at 231 (footnote omitted). The Commission also noted
that support of a rezoning in an adopted plan enhanced the success of that action on judicial
review, along with reasons being given for the action taken, both hallmarks of quasi-judicial
activity. Mandelker had hoped that the ALI Model Code might present a point of departure for
rethinking the role of the plan and the use of an administrative model for evaluating regulations.
MANDELKER, supra note 9, at xiii-iv. The Model Code turned out to be a compromise that
likely disappointed Mandelker.
100. Fishman, supra note 3, at 263-70. In deciding small-tract amendments are quasi-
judicial, the Fasano court relied on, Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendments: The
Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972); neither the court nor
Mandelker originated the concept. More likely, it arose out of two early Supreme Court
administrative law cases: Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915); Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). But Mandelker, more
than any other source, however, publicized this change in the land use field. Mandelker
concluded as early as 1971 that confusion reigned in the courts as to how to deal with small-
tract rezonings:
Perhaps reflecting the difficulties we have been discussing, the courts are simply not
clear in deciding how to treat their review of a legislative rezoning. There are strong
statements that the only justification for a rezone is found in the community plan. On
the other hand, many cases examine rezones on a narrower neighborhood scale without
getting involved in the larger community issues. The result is a confusion in which it is
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Given his extensive writing in the area, it is highly likely that
Mandelker was the catalyst for the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on the role of the plan in land use regulations and the
role of the courts in reviewing small-tract rezonings. The wording of
the rationale is similar, as is the use of caselaw and statutes. The
Commission recommended, inter alia, that:
a. The grant or denial of development on a particular parcel of
land is an adjudicatory decision where due process considerations
mandate a modicum of fairness to the parties, rather than assignment
of a presumption of legislative validity.101
b. State land use enabling legislation should be amended to
provide “for administrative review of individual requests” for
development, including zoning changes.102
It is not surprising that an entire chapter of this Report deals with
the role of the comprehensive plan in resolving the urban housing
difficult to say just what the courts should be talking about in rezoning litigation. . . .
When a rezone has been granted to the developer, we usually find an argument that the
zoning is a “spot” zoning which is invalid. But just what makes the spot zoning unconstitutional
is not clear, and we did not get much guidance from our Oregon cases. Is it the size of the area
rezoned? Many observations to this effect appear in the cases, and a judicial preference for
large rezones supports our own observations that larger tracts permit the developer to
internalize his externalities and take advantage of the size of the site to protect neighbors from
harmful consequences. The thought also appears that the spot zone is arbitrary, that a denial of
Equal Protection in the constitutional sense occurs because the developer is allowed a rezone in
circumstances in which it is denied to others. Then the comment is made that the rezone can be
justified and these objections overcome, but only provided the rezone is found to be justified in
the community interest. When this approach is taken, reliance on the comprehensive plan as an
expression of that community interest is made explicit. What the courts are saying is that they
will examine the development tradeoffs that have been made at the community level to
determine if the policy underlying the rezoning decision justifies the rezone at the specific site,
and forecloses the allegation that the rezone arbitrarily favors the fortunate developer. Nothing
prevents the courts from making the same kind of inquiry when the issue is a denial of a zone
change to the developer, but the concentration on the developer’s alleged deprivation of
property without Due Process probably diverts the court’s attention from the larger issues. See
MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 82-84 (footnotes omitted).
101. Fishman, supra note 3, at 320-21. The Policy Statements suggested a Fasano-type
approach to ex-parte or pre-hearing contacts to require that such statements be made on the
record and that findings be based on the record made, so as to avoid the “second-guessing” that
often accompanies de novo trial court review.
102. Fishman, supra note 3, at 321. The preference for the use of legislative, as opposed to
judicial, changes to reach this goal is also a Mandelker hallmark. The Commission suggested
the use of hearings examiners (Policy Statement 6) and regional and state review, if deemed
necessary (Policy Statement 9), as well. Id. at 322-23.
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problem. The chapter cites many of the same works and cases that
Mandelker previously used to explain the history, nature, and legal
status of the plan. It is also not surprising that the chapter builds a
careful case for the plan’s political and legal legitimacy as the basis
for land use regulation.103 The Advisory Commission also
recommended mandatory planning requirements for local
governments (and suggested that certain elements, including housing,
be included in such a requirement), along with a consistency
requirement so that regulations conform to the adopted plan.104 Each
of these conclusions has Professor Mandelker’s indelible stamp.105
3. The Snyder Case— Mandelker’s work in the ALI Code is well
known. Florida is the only state that adopted major portions of the
ALI code and faced the issue of whether a small-tract rezoning is a
legislative act in Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County
v. Snyder.106 In Snyder, the county commissioners denied a rezoning
request that was consistent with the local plan.107 The county urged a
103. See Fishman supra note 3, at 325-410. In The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan
in Land Use Regulation, id. at 358-70, in which the role of the plan in rezoning is once again
discussed with the Oregon cases Fasano and Baker in the forefront.
104. Fishman, supra note 3, at 381-97 and 403-08.
105. See id. at 408-10. Note the following excerpts from some of the Policy Statements at
the end of chapter 5 in the Role of the Comprehensive Plan:
1. [The] plan should be an independent, comprehensive document expressing the
collective planning judgment of the community.
2. State enabling legislation, traditionally permissive in its approach to local planning,
should be amended to require local comprehensive planning and to require that the
exercise of local land-use controls be consistent with local comprehensive plans. . . .
6.  . . . It is concluded in this Report that the effective implementation of mandatory
local planning requires the courts to give presumptive weight to the policies of the
comprehensive plan as they are applied in land-use control administration, unless
circumstances exist that indicate the plan is no longer entitled to this preference.
7. Local planning that is required by state enabling legislation raises the question of
whether state enabling legislation should contain guidance for the local planning
process, either by specifying the necessary linkages among the statutory planning
elements required to produce an acceptable plan, or by prescribing goals for the
planning process (without prescribing the contents of the local plan). Legislative
direction is required that at least will mandate the development of a local plan in which
these policy issues will be considered and resolved.
Id. at 408-10.
106. 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
107. Id. at 471.
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deferential standard of review, the “fairly debatable” rule, which was
used to uphold the legislative act of adoption of a zoning ordinance in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.108 In support of its decision to
use greater scrutiny, the Florida Supreme Court cited Mandelker,
along with his colleagues, Richard Babcock and Charles Haar.109 The
court’s views on the history of planning law could have been written
by Mandelker himself.
Inhibited only by the loose judicial scrutiny afforded by the fairly
debatable rule, local zoning systems developed in a markedly
inconsistent manner. Many land use experts and practitioners have
been critical of the local zoning system. Richard Babcock deplored
the effect of ‘neighborhoodism’ and rank political influence on the
local decision-making process. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning
Game (1966). Mandelker and Professor Dan Tarlock recently stated
that ‘zoning decisions are too often ad hoc, sloppy and self-serving
decisions with well-defined adverse consequences without off-setting
benefits.’110
The court determined that the approach of Fasano, that is, to treat
small-tract zoning amendments as quasi-judicial actions, was the
better approach. Not surprisingly, this too was the approach that
Mandelker had championed.111
108. Supra note 15. Id. at 472 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388 (1926).
109. Id. at 471.
110. See Snyder, 627 So.2d at 472-73. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 2 (1992).
111. Id. Indeed, it may have well been that Fasano was the product of Mandelker’s
trenchant criticism of previous Oregon caselaw on rezoning. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 72-
75. The following excerpt is illustrative:
Moreover, the court ignored the fact that the very nature of the planning process leads
to land use proposals that are more general than the zoning ordinance classification.
Not to give meaning to the plan in view of this tendency is to dilute the effect of the
planning process and give a superior position to the ordinance in spite of the statutory
command that the plan has preference.
Id. at 75. In other areas of planning law, i.e., the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair
Housing Act, Mandelker’s work has been cited by the United States Supreme Court in City of
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732 (1995). Edmonds determined that single-
family district regulations themselves could not be used to keep out the disabled and cited
Mandelker’s work on the nature of the single-family zone. Like Snyder, the result was one
favored by Mandelker. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Issues, in AIDS LAW TODAY (Scott
Barris et al. eds., 1993).
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These three examples demonstrate only some of the fruits of the
work of Professor Mandelker in the two planning law areas discussed
in this article. The acceptance of the leading role of the
comprehensive plan in land use regulation and the view of small-tract
zoning changes as quasi-judicial are favorite topics of Mandelker’s
work. Both are seen as the emerging majority viewpoint, owing in no
small part to his vast labors.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1982, Professor Mandelker and a colleague reviewed the work
of the late Professor Donald G. Hagman, following the latter’s
untimely death.112 The article describes the work of another great
planning law writer, discussing in some detail Professor Hagman’s
contributions to the understanding of land use, local government, and
environmental law, as well as stressing the work of Hagman as
teacher and scholar.113
To some extent this same effort must be extended in reviewing
and evaluating the work of Professor Mandelker, who has been active
for more than fifty years, as compared with Professor Hagman’s
nineteen. Although planning law is the poorer for the loss of
Professor Hagman, Professor Mandelker’s colleagues are able to
celebrate Mandelker’s work as teacher, writer, and scholar while he is
able to enjoy and participate in those celebrations.
Many of those qualities that brought praise to Professor Hagman
may be found in Daniel Mandelker. Like Hagman, Mandelker is a
teacher and prodigious author. Like Hagman, he has played the role
of prophet, often in the academic wilderness, advocating rationality
in planning law against an entrenched world-view. Like Hagman, he
has a strong sense of social justice. Like Hagman, he organized and
explained complex cases and statutes.114 Finally, like Hagman, he has
112. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Professor Hagman’s Legacy to Legal
Scholarship, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 770 (1982). See also Mandelker, In Memoriam: Donald G.
Hagman, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1982).
113. Id.
114. In particular, Mandelker says that law professors especially are called upon “to use the
great mass of legal and non-legal secondary literature to reconceptualize problems in an effort
to provide fresh insight into the role of the legal system, if any, in improving existing methods
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often thought “outside the box” of conventional land use views.115
Mandelker is an original thinker who took up the “disconnect”
between the requirement that zoning be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and the actual planning practice. But he went far
beyond Charles Haar’s raising the issue by suggesting remedies.
Regarding the role of the comprehensive plan, Mandelker has
spent much of his academic career advocating conscious adoption of
public policy as the basis for land use regulations. Generally, his
advocacy is aimed at legislative reform. However, Mandelker has
also selected, analyzed, and emphasized those cases in which courts
have interpreted existing land use enabling legislation to give
significance, or priority, to the comprehensive plan in evaluating land
use regulations or changes thereto. Similarly, Mandelker has used the
same approach of case selection, analysis, and emphasis to deal with
the method of review of small-tract rezonings, an issue that has
perplexed courts and academics alike. Rationality in formulating and
applying public policy has been the hallmark of Mandelker’s
career.116
of conflict resolution.” Mandelker & Talock, supra note 112, at 775 (footnote omitted). They
add that breaking down the dichotomy between doctrinal and theoretical legal scholarship has
been upsetting to many of those teaching law. Id. The authors also state that one of Professor
Hagman’s most important contributions to the law was his explanation of the role of plans in
subsequent land use decisions, even if Hagman was opposed to the need for mandatory
planning. Id. at 776.
115. One of Professor Hagman’s major contributions to planning law was his seminal
Windfalls for Wipeouts, which he co-edited with Dean Myscynski in 1978. WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (Donald G. Hagman et al. eds., 1978).
This work suggested a brilliant solution to the takings issue in the compensation of those
severely damaged by land use actions. This compensation was to come from a tax on those who
did well by public policy decisions. Mandelker’s advocacy regarding the role of the plan and
the method of review of small-tract zone changes is at least as comparable as that of Hagman on
the takings issue.
116. Mandelker stresses this rationality himself: We clearly need to sort out more
rigorously just what it is we are trying to achieve in out-planning for an urban environment.
This point needs to be underscored, for public intervention in the land development
market carries heavy penalties for the losers and substantial gains for the winners. If
zoning is not to result in arbitrary decision-making, it must be based on a policy which
sensitively discriminates between cases of refusal and cases of approval on grounds
which are supportable in matters of substance and of equity. If the King County zoning
study teaches anything, it teaches the need for a reexamination of the postulates of our
planning and zoning process, and of the legal framework which we employ to carry it
out.
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Although Mandelker was not the originator of these two ideas, he
extensively used his visible forums of lectures and law review articles
to shape solutions to difficult problems. He also used these forums to
advocate solutions beyond their academic or judicial incipience. The
high regard in which he is held at the academy and the bar have lent
credence to those ideas, placing them in greater circulation and
giving them support. Mandelker’s long service to the American
Planning Association, American Bar Association, Urban Law
Institute, and his long tenure at Washington University in St. Louis
make him a fixture in those organizations and provide a considerable
base for his contributions.
Mandelker’s academic work is without comparison in its volume
and quality. For most of his career, he has been in the classroom
interacting with bright young minds and proposing provocative law
reform. But just as importantly, Mandelker has labored in the
vineyards of planning law in endless committee meetings, peer
reviews, and academic study. He has written in criticism and praise
and authored legislation. For all this, we celebrate him and his work.
As mentioned, much of Mandelker’s work has been in planning law
activities other than those covered in this article. His work in
transportation law, environmental law, and in social justice in land
use regulation is particularly important.
However, it may be argued that Mandelker’s most significant and
long-lasting contribution to the reform of planning law is refocusing
planners and planning attorneys on the necessary role policy plays in
formulating and administering land use regulations. In particular, he
has redirected these decision-makers to the precise function
undertaken when small-tract rezonings occur. This structural
understanding of the relationship between planning and land use
Id. at 167-68. Mandelker then gives his own thoughts on policy implementation:
Unfortunately, we have not been as rigorous as we should in examining the impact of
our planning judgments on our zoning strategies, and on the role the legal system
should play in appraising, validating, and limiting both. We are simply not sure of the
values we wish to implement in our urban policies. Until we are, we can continue to
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regulation has shifted the dialogue to the nature of using appropriate
policy. During Mandelker’s “watch,” due significantly to his efforts,
plans have moved from being aspirational and ineffective to being the
necessary predicate of regulation. Moreover, by replacing the
formalistic, “legislative” character of rezoning with a functional view
of how zoning implements state, regional, or local policy in the plan,
Mandelker has changed the way we think about planning law. We,
his colleagues, are forever grateful for his work.
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